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Introduction
There is a lively debate among students of social stratification and social mobility as to how the political and economic regime of a nation affects who gets ahead and who is able to pass their socioeconomic advantages on to their children. There are, of course, some obvious cases where institutional arrangements matter a great deal. South Africa comes to mind as a political system that until very recently was self-consciously organized to advantage the white minority at the expense of the majority of the population (Lapping, 1987; Thompson, 1990) . The People's Republic of China is another case in point, with an extended history of state control of educational and occupational opportunities, particularly during the Cultural Revolution (Unger, 1982; Deng and Treiman, 1997) .
But such examples are relatively rare, and the Eastern European case is by no means so obvious-on either theoretical or empirical grounds. While some have argued that in the early days of communism, those with bourgeois backgrounds were actively discriminated against, there is a substantial body of thought-accompanied by many empirical studies-that suggests that the "distortions" of the Stalinist period were just that-short-lived deviations from a system of status attainment and social mobility that did not differ fundamentally from that of Western countries (1960; Parkin, 1971; Giddens, 1973; Connor, 1979; Lane, 1982) .
The theoretical basis for expecting that the stratification system of Eastern European communist societies will tend to be similar to that of Western countries is the claim that the primary process by which individuals achieve high socioeconomic status in any industrialized society is by getting educated, and hence that the principal way families can pass on their advantages to their children is by ensuring that they are well educated (Treiman, 1970; Treiman and Yip, 1989) . The direct inheritance of occupational positions is very limited in modern societies because most jobs 2 are bureaucratically allocated (in the Weberian sense); for the most part, the only positions that can be directly inherited are self-employment in farming, small business, or professional practice. Thus, in most industrialized societies no more than about 10 per cent of the male population does the same work as their fathers (as measured by 3-digit occupation codes) and no more than about 20 per cent are even in the same occupational class (as measured by EGP categories).
1 The direct inheritance of wealth is also very limited, largely because people in modern industrial societies live so long that wealth typically is inherited too late to have much effect on life chances. 2 What families transmit to their children, the argument goes, is mainly "cultural capital"-the sets of cognitive and social skills, knowledge, and motivations that promote school success and promote success in the labor market as well. Insofar as this claim is correct, there is little reason to expect much difference between Eastern and Western Europe in either the extent or pattern of intergenerational mobility.
Reasons for Expecting a Distinctive Communist Stratification System
However, the counter claim is that even if the dominant pattern of socioeconomic attainment in Eastern Europe is very similar to that of Western industrialized countries, the peculiar features of the Eastern Europe experience have created a stratification and mobility regime that differs in some crucial respects from the stratification system typical of Western nations. In this paper, we address one potentially distinctive feature of the Eastern European experience, the way the transition both to and from communism affected patterns of property ownership and, in particular, intergenerational transfers. Of special interest here is to determine the extent to which property was restored to pre-communist propertied families after the collapse of communism in 1989.
We do this by exploiting data from the project, "Social Stratification in Eastern Europe after
1989." Six countries were studied: Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Russia, and Slovakia. In each country a probability sample of about 5,000 members of the general population was surveyed in 1993 (except that the Polish survey was delayed until 1994 and was limited to about 3,500 respondents due to budgetary constraints), using an essentially identical questionnaire that included extensive questions on the socioeconomic characteristics and property ownership of respondents, their parents, and grandparents. 3 The present analysis excludes Russia since private ownership of land or businesses was abolished in the 1920's and 1930's (Riasonovsky, 2000) , too early for questions even about grandparents' property ownership to be relevant for most respondents.
Two distinctive features of the Eastern European communist experiment are worthy of note.
First, at the time of the transition to communism there was substantial state intervention in the stratification system, of three kinds.
(i). A great deal of private wealth was taken over by the state. As we see from Table 1, many people in Eastern Europe (22 to 39 per cent of the parents and 18 to 41 per cent of the grandparents of our 1993 4 respondents) owned land in 1948, just before the communists came to power, and a few owned businesses. 5 Except for Poland, land was confiscated from a sizable fraction-at least one third of the land-owning population, and as high as 69 per cent of land-owning parents in Hungary (Table 2) . Among the new communist regimes, Poland was the only one that did not collectivize agriculture. 6 Businesses also were removed from private ownership; except in Poland, more than 18 per cent, and as high as 54 per cent, of business-owning parents and grandparents had their businesses "confiscated." 7 By contrast to land and businesses, relatively small numbers of parents and grandparents had their houses and apartments confiscated-well under 10 per cent and usually less than five per cent.
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(ii). Some people (particularly those who were hostile to the new regime, or were of dubious loyalty), lost their jobs and had to take less desirable jobs; and others did better in the new regime. Table 3 shows a cross-tabulation of the occupations of fathers of respondents in 1952 by their occupations in 1948. Again, we tabulated the data for fathers rather than for respondents because relatively few respondents were old enough to have jobs in 1948. Here, we combined all five countries to get an over-all sense of the kinds of changes that took place in Eastern Europe in consequence of the transformation to communism (for more detailed analyses of the effect of this transition on intergenerational mobility patterns, see Domanski, 1998 Domanski, , 1999 Wong and Treiman, 1998 König and Müller 5 (1986, 88) show that over a five year period (from 1965-1970) there was more upward than downward mobility in both France and Germany. Similarly, Haller et al. (1985, 589) , in a comparison of Austria, France, and the U.S., find much more upward than downward mobility between the first job and the job held by men when they were surveyed. Because the general tendency is for workers (at least male workers) to secure better jobs as their careers progress, the downward shift accompanying the transformation to communist regimes is quite remarkable.
(iii). Upon seizing power, communist governments in eastern Europe immediately adopted a set of policies to equalize educational opportunity. These policies can be divided into two categories: those that expanded educational opportunities for the working and peasant classes and those that restricted educational opportunities for members of the upper classes. Scholarly attention has tended to focus on the latter. Researchers frequently cite the implementation of class-based quotas reserving one-half or more of the seats in academic institutions to students from workingclass and peasant backgrounds (Robert, 1991; Heyns and Bialecki, 1993; Szelenyi and Aschaffenburg, 1993) . These quotas remained officially in place until the early 1960s, but many observers have argued that they were not strictly enforced after the death of Stalin in 1953, when a noticeable thaw in the stance of the party began to occur (Simkus and Andorka, 1982; Rothschild, 1993) . Furthermore, the educational system was expanding rapidly during this period, and in the context of a rapidly expanding educational system, the presence of official quotas may not have represented a serious obstacle to upper-class entry into academic institutions. In fact, both Simkus and Andorka (1982) and Hanley (2001) found that the effect of social origins on the odds of making the transition into secondary and tertiary institutions did not change noticeably in either Hungary or Czechoslovakia after the Communist seizure of power.
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Second, in the post-communist regime there also was state intervention in the stratification system in the form of laws restoring confiscated property to its former owners or their heirs. Only in Poland no systematic effort to compensate the owners of nationalized state property, in part because agricultural property was not collectivized during the state socialist period and there was therefore less demand within Poland for the restitution of property to pre-war owners. In Hungary, compensation has been only partial. For the most part, the Hungarian government did not return nationalized property, most of which involved land forcibly collectivized in the 1950s, to previous owners. Instead, the government issued compensation tickets that could be used to bid for land in auctions sponsored by agricultural cooperatives or to acquire shares in state enterprises listed on the Budapest Stock Exchange. Reliance on vouchers rather than the return of real property resulted in individuals receiving far less than full market value for the property that they and their families had lost during the communist period (Frydman et al., 1993; Earle et al., 1994) .
In the remaining three countries actual property has been restored to the families of former owners and, when this has not been possible, compensation has been paid. For example, in Czechoslovakia, public pressure forced the first post-communist government to institute a sweeping restitution law that returned or provided compensation for property nationalized after 1948 to its previous owners or their descendants. The properties affected included small businesses, industrial enterprises, multifamily housing, and agricultural cooperatives in those cases in which title was taken from former owners. Due to the peculiarities of collectivization policies in Czechoslovakia, most land owners retained title to the land which they contributed to agricultural cooperatives. By the end of 1993, restitution was largely complete for nonagricultural properties but not yet complete for farms and forests (Frydman et al., 1993; Earle et al., 1994; Strong et al., 1996) . Progress on urban properties was relatively quick, with almost 60 percent of urban properties claimed having been restituted by June 1993 (Strong et al., 1996) . Restitution of agricultural lands progressed more slowly due to difficulties in verifying titles and the failure to dismantle collective farms, which continued to own assets vital to agricultural production. For these and other reasons, as of August 1992 only 50 per cent of the former owners had applied for restitution and only 10 per cent of nationalized land had been returned (Earle et al., 1994) .
If the restitution laws were effective, we would expect those whose families had property in 1948 to be more likely than others to have property in 1993. 11 This turns out to be so, although the associations are fairly modest. Table 4 shows the percentage owning various kinds of property in 1993, depending on the extent of family property ownership in 1948. Consider home ownership.
In each of the five nations the proportion owning their own home in 1993 is higher when the parents owned a house in 1948 than when the parents and grandparents owned no property in 1948, although the difference is only substantial for the Czech Republic (42 per cent vs. 28 per cent). The pattern with respect to land ownership is similar, but the differences are somewhat larger-in all five nations, the descendants of former land owners were at least twice as likely to own land in 1993 as were the descendants of those who owned no property. In general, other forms of property holding in 1993 also reflect differences in the extent of 1948 property. Thus, we can conclude that there was at least modest continuity from the pre-communist to the post-communist period with respect to property holding.
Determinants of Property Holding in 1993
Of course, this result could arise in a number of different ways. There are three basic possibilities:
(i). Family property holdings may have remained intact throughout the communist period.
(ii). Those whose families owned property prior to the communist period may have had it restored. Unfortunately, our data are not adequate to permit us to definitively decide among these possibilities, since the surveys failed to solicit information about the extent of property holding by respondents during the communist period. However, we can narrow down the range of possibilities.
We do this by predicting the odds of holding property in 1993 (owning one's own residence, owning land, owning a business (defined as being self-employed with employees), and owning other real estate, apart from a vacation home) from the extent of 1948 family property holding, the respondent's occupation in 1988, and whether the respondent was a member of the communist party in 1988. Specifically, we estimate four binomial logistic regression equations, where in each case the dependent variable is the expected log odds of having a given kind of property in 1993.
9 each equation, the independent variables include three dummy variables measuring 1948 property ownership (each scored 1 if the parents or grandparents owned, respectively, a house, land, or a business in 1948, and 0 otherwise); a set of dummy variables measuring occupational class in 1988
(a six-category version of the EGP scheme plus an extra category to identify those not in the labor force); whether the respondent was a member of the communist party in 1948; and, as controls, a set of dummy variables indicating the type of place of current residence (the capital city, another city, or a town, with village the omitted category) and a linear representation of age.
We explored models that included whether people got restitution tickets but ultimately decided against including this variable on both empirical and conceptual grounds. Empirically, holding a restitution ticket has virtually no net impact on 1993 property holding-of 20 coefficients (five nations by four kinds of property), only three were significant and these were very small in size and two implied reduced odds of property restoration. This is not altogether surprising, given that receipt of a restitution ticket depended in a straightforward way on the type of pre-communist family property holdings. Only if initial receipt of restitution were itself politically determined could receipt of a restitution voucher have an independent effect. Thus, on conceptual grounds as well, it makes little sense to add holding a restitution voucher to the model predicting 1993 property.
If the respondent's family's pre-communist class position-as measured by variables capturing the extent of 1948 property holdings-influences the likelihood of post-communist property net of the other factors in the model, we have strong evidence of family class continuity.
We use a set of dummy variables measuring 1988 occupational status as an indicator of the socioeconomic position of respondents at the end of the old (communist) regime. If socioeconomic achievements during the communist era affect post-communist property holding, we must then consider two alternative possibilities: that the pre-communist class position of the family affected late communist period socioeconomic status, so that the continuity in family property holding was indirect, through the maintenance of the sort of socioeconomic advantage possible in a communist regime (Szelenyi's notion of "parking orbits"-see Szelenyi, 1988) ; or that there was no link between the pre-communist class position of the family and the respondent's socioeconomic position during the late communist period-that is, that the communist regime effectively destroyed the precommunist class structure.
Membership in the communist party in 1988, on the eve of the collapse of communism, also serves as an indicator of the socioeconomic position of respondents at the end of the old regime.
We include this variable to test the possibility that party members are particularly likely to be able to acquire property after the collapse of communism, either through insider information with respect to privatization policies and other aspects of social capital (Staniszkis, 1991; Rona-Tas, 1994 ; RonaTas and Guseva 2001) or because of their human capital and other personal qualities (Gerber 2000 (Gerber , 2001 ).
There are two sets of additional variables in the model: age and a set of dummy variables measuring size of place of residence. These variables are introduced simply as controls, to clarify the interpretation of the variables of substantive interest. It is likely that both land holding and residential ownership is more common among those living in rural areas, and property holding of all kinds tends to increase with age. Controlling for these variables means that we can interpret the effect of other variables without concern that the results are confounded by differentials in the property holding of people living in different size communities or people of different ages. land, or a business, or some combination of these forms of ownership-increases the odds of home ownership in 1993. Note that these results are independent of the effects of occupational status and communist party membership at the end of the communist era, and also of size of place of residence.
They thus suggest real family continuity in the propensity to own property over two or three generations and nearly half a century.
Not surprisingly, considering the importance of housing as a perquisite of status during the communist era, managerial or professional status in 1988 tends to increase the odds of owning residential property in 1993, in all nations except Slovakia. These effects are particularly pronounced in Poland. It is probable that those in advantageous occupations during the communist period were able to exploit whatever opportunities existed to purchase residential property, either during the communist period or after the transformation. After all, they were better paid; had better connections; and understood better how to exploit the system (Szelenyi, 1978 (Szelenyi, , 1982 The story with respect to land ownership is similar, although not identical. The odds of owning land in 1993 are two to 3 ½ times as great for individuals from pre-communist land-owning families as for others. Note that we have controlled for size of place and 1998 occupation, so we are not simply picking up either an urban-rural distinction or the propensity of those engaged in agriculture to own their land. By contrast, pre-communist home or business ownership has no impact on 1993 land ownership.
Not surprisingly, those engaged in agriculture in 1988 were more likely to own land in 1993 than were those engaged in non-agricultural pursuits in 1988, as were those living in a village in 1993.
But it also appears that, with the exception of Bulgaria, having a high status occupation in 1988 increased the likelihood of owning land in 1993. Thus, once again we have evidence of the ability of the "winners" at the end of the communist era being able to land on their feet and become winners in the post-communist era as well.
Land ownership follows the same age pattern as home ownership-the propensity increases rapidly with age, and again the age gradient is strongest in Bulgaria.
Current ownership of "other property" (which excludes vacation homes) is another variation on the same theme, albeit in somewhat muted form. There is some suggestion that the likelihood of owning other property in 1993 is increased for those from pre-communist property-owning families, but the evidence is fairly weak and somewhat inconsistent across countries. By contrast, What remains open is the extent to which occupational status in the late communist period, and, for the new entrepreneurs, communist party membership, were indirect routes by which precommunist property owning was sustained within families. Table 6 assesses the determinants of communist party membership. Although there are tantalizing suggestions (e.g., the doubled odds of party membership for the children of land owners in Bulgaria and Poland-presumably absentee owners in Poland, given the strong net effect of home ownership in reducing the odds of party membership), in general there appears to be no consistent effect of pre-communist family property ownership in either enhancing or suppressing the odds of joining the party. Rather, the usual factors are implicated: education and parental party membership enhance the odds of joining the party (and remaining a member as late as 1988); men are much more likely than women to be party members;
and there is some suggestion that father's occupational status (as measured by ISEI-see Ganzeboom and Treiman. 1996) reduces the odds of party membership net of other factors. high status jobs at the end of the communist period. In this sense there is notable family status continuity over time: pre-communist family property ownership enhances the odds of postcommunist property ownership both directly, as we saw in Table 5 , and indirectly, through high status occupational positions, as we see in Tables 5 and 6 . Pre-communist family property ownership also led indirectly to post-communist entrepreneurship, by increasing the odds of attaining elite positions, which provided an important springboard for entrepreneurship after the collapse of communism.
Conclusions
We conclude by returning to the title of the paper: Did the transformation to post-communism in Eastern Europe restore pre-communist property relations? Our answer is yes, to a very substantial degree. Those whose families held property in 1948 were much more likely than others to have property in 1993, either because they had it restored or because they maintained it throughout the communist era or because they acquired high status positions during the communist period, which they used to enhance their chances of becoming property owners early in the new post-communist
dispensation. There appears to be continuity with respect to residential property ownership and-in the three countries where compensation or restitution was more than symbolic-both continuity and restoration with respect to land and investment property. Entrepreneurship, however, follows a different process, with pre-communist property holding creating little direct advantage, except perhaps in Hungary, but creating an important indirect advantage by enhancing the odds of attaining elite occupations during the communist period.
1. In the five Eastern European studied here, on average 7.3 per cent of male respondents were in the same ISCO 88 3-digit category (International Labour Office, 1989) as their fathers and only 15.2 per cent were even in the same EGP 10 category (Erikson and Goldthorpe, 1992, 35-47 2. In the U.S., for example, around 60 per cent of the women reaching age 55 in 1980 still had a living parent (Watkins et al., 1987, 349 Europe, the communist governments immediately set about to collectivize agriculture.
Formally, this involved the voluntary leasing of land to the collective, but in practice the decision to join a cooperative was not a free one. Individuals who remained outside the framework of the cooperative found it very difficult to obtain necessary inputs (Kornai, 1992) .
Thus the elimination of small farmers has much in common with the disappearance of urban artisans. In neither case was property nationalized; rather, through a variety of fiscal measures and other coercive mechanisms such as the denial of necessary inputs, both artisans and farmers were forced to abandon their private enterprises.
The collectivization of agriculture sparked resistance on the part of private farmers in Eastern Europe. In Hungary, for example, collectivization proceeded in two waves. Noncooperation on the part of farmers convinced the government to halt temporarily the collectivization drive in the 1950s. The collectivization of agriculture was not completed in Hungary until 1963, by which time the vast majority of rural farmers belonged to a cooperative (Berend and Ranki, 1974) . Resistance to Communist rule on the part of workers and farmers was even more pronounced in Poland than in Hungary. A political crisis had forced the Soviet Union to return Gomulka, a legitimate national hero, to power in the early 1950s. It was Gomulka who decided to abandoned the policy of collectivization altogether (Berend and Ranki, 1974) . Arable land remained in the hands of private owners throughout the period of communist rule in Poland. This not only affected the rate of industrial development in that country, it also meant that in Poland, state intervention in the stratification system did not proceed as far as in Hungary or the Czech Republic.
7. There is a bit of a misconception regarding the confiscation of businesses during communist rule in Eastern Europe. For the most part, only large businesses were "nationalized"-seized by the government. In many cases the nationalization of industries occurred before the consolidation of communist power in 1949, and were not unpopular actions. The elimination of independent artisans and shop owners proceeded quite differently, however. In most cases, the property of these individuals was not seized. Instead, communist governments resorted to more indirect but equally effective means of driving small urban entrepreneurs out of business.
This involved a combination of high taxes and the inability to obtain the inputs on which their enterprises depended from the state sector. Within five years after the establishment of communist governments, the petty bourgeoisie had been effectively driven out of existence in all of the countries in question (Berend and Ranki, 1974) . It may well be that when respondents report that the business of their parents or grandparents was "confiscated," they actually mean only that the parent or grandparent lost the business as a result of the action of the communist regime.
8. The proportion mobile would be even higher if we included those who left the labor force between 1948 and 1952, since it is likely that there was a certain amount of "forced retirement" then just as there was during the transition to post-communism. 10. The division of Czechoslovakia into two independent republics on 1 January 1993 did not affect the restitution programs described here. Much of the property in question had already been returned by the time of the division, and both countries continued to enforce restitution laws after the separation.
11. Although it might seem that 1993 (or 1994 in Poland) is too early to capture the full impact of property restitution, restitution policies were implemented very quickly after the fall of communism so that most urban restitution had already been carried out by the time our data were collected. Agricultural restitution in the Czech Republic and Bulgaria was not completed by the time the data were collected (Strong et al., 1996) . It should be noted, however, that our analysis already established a strong link between family ownership of land in 1948 and ownership of land in 1993 in both of these countries. Because the restitution of agricultural property in both Bulgaria and the Czech Republic proceeds along familial lines, the completion of the process in both countries likely resulted in a strengthening of the association already uncovered here.
12. These equations, as well as those reported in Tables 6 and 7 , were estimated using Stata 8.0's survey estimation procedures to correct for the fact that all of our samples were multistage probability samples with observations clustered by locale, which means that standard errors estimated assuming random sampling will generally be too small. To define PSU's, we used the lowest level of geography available to us, designated by the code for "city" within "district"
within "region." For Table 7 , we treated each nation as a separate stratum. a The percentages are computed from all cases in each sample. Non-responses (which are substantial for parents and grandparents) are treated as negative cases, on the ground that if people did not know whether their parents or grandparents owned property, any possible ownership was of no value to them. b For all countries but Poland, the item refers to 1993; for Poland, the question refers to 1994. c Per cent self-employed with employees. d The high rate of ownership of stocks and bonds in the Czech Republic and Slovakia is a result of the voucher privatization program, which began in 1992 and gave to each citizen vouchers that could be sold or converted into shares in the large fraction of state enterprises that were privatized (Martin Kreidl, personal communication) . Ownership of such shares probably peaked in the mid-1990's, judging from the fact that Ve…erník and Mat.jç (1999, 73) report that 70 per cent of the Czech population owned stocks and bonds in 1996, 64 per cent in 1997, and 53 per cent in 1998. Erikson and Goldthorpe (1992, 35-47) ; Ganzeboom et al. (1992) ; Ganzeboom and Treiman (1996) . 
a The typology used here is created by distinguishing those whose parents or grandparents owned no property in 1948; those with a house only, but no land or business; those with land but no business, regardless of whether they owned a house (except for Poland, where 26% of land owners owned no home, no more than about 10% own land but no home); and those who owned a business, regardless of whether they owned land or a home. 
